Introduction
The 2007-2010 crisis showed that the vicious dynamics of liquidity risk can undermine the stability of the financial system. The drying up of market liquidity caused funding strains at financial institutions and their reactions to the market stress exacerbated the market tensions. The episode underscored the strong link between banks' funding liquidity (the ability to raise cash to fund asset holdings) and market liquidity (the ability to convert assets into cash at a given price at short notice). The interaction between them and the reactions by market participants are amplification mechanisms that aggravate liquidity problems ('liquidity spirals') and may cause second round effects. The multiple dimensions of liquidity risk, its dynamics and the influence of policy measures are hard to understand, let alone to quantify. Nonetheless, there is a need in the financial sector and among policymakers to measure those aspects (IMF, 2010) , to assess the resilience of the sector to liquidity shocks and give guidance to the policy of central banks and regulators. Central banks have responded to the increased systemic risk with extended liquidity supply through unconventional monetary policy measures. This has supported the functioning of the money market and averted a collapse of the banking system. Regulators, organised in the Basel Committee, have responded by proposing new regulation (Basel III) aimed at strengthening the liquidity buffers of banks and reducing funding mismatches (BCBS, 2009 (BCBS, , 2010 .
That proposed regulation is the basic principle in this paper. We refrain from discussing whether a price-based (through taxing) or a quantity approach (through buffers) is most optimal, as in Perotti and Suarez (2010) .
The recent literature has added to the understanding of liquidity risk in relation to the behaviour of market participants. Several studies link the drying up of market liquidity to precautionary hoarding. Uncertainty is found to be a main reason for this. In the model of Eisenschmidt and Tapking (2009) banks refrain from lending to other banks due to uncertainty about their own liquidity needs, while Acharya et al. (2009) assume that pessimistic expectations lead to a freeze in the interbank market. Liedorp et al. (2010) show that interbank contagion primarily runs through funding exposures. Acharya et al. (2008) show that banks with surplus liquidity have an incentive to under provide liquidity to benefit from fire sales of assets, if there is imperfect competition in the interbank market. Such predatory behaviour can lead to a decrease of market liquidity and a freeze in the interbank market. The interaction between funding liquidity and market liquidity is further exposed in the study by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) , who model liquidity spirals. These are due to market illiquidity that increases funding constraints as a result of higher margins and to funding shocks that hit traders and induce them to reduce trading positions, which adds to market illiquidity. Cornett et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence on the relationship between liquidity profiles of US banks and adjustments of their loan books in the crisis. They show that banks with more stable sources of funding were better able to continue lending. Fernando at al. (2008) demonstrate that market collapse can be an endogenous phenomenon, depending on the commonality in the liquidity needs of market participants. This fits in the endogenous cycle view of instability, where risk is endogenous with respect to collective behaviour of market participants. Their reactions amplify shocks and aggravate a liquidity crisis. Endogenous cycle models, where risk is endogenous with respect to collective behaviour of market participants, are still primitive, with very limited behavioural content (Borio and Drehmann, 2009 ). This also holds for macro stress-testing models that are used by central banks and supervisory authorities to simulate shocks to the system as a whole. Even in the most sophisticated stress-testing models, the behaviour of financial institutions is included by rules of thumb rather than through empirical estimations.
Responses are usually assumed to be triggered by shocks that lead to a declining solvency ratio of banks below a certain threshold level. This default risk can be caused by a drying up of market liquidity which depresses the value of banks' assets, as in Cifuentes et al. (2005) . This triggers fire sales of assets, depressing market prices and inducing further sales. Default risk is also a trigger for portfolio adjustments by banks in the stress-testing framework of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Boss et al., 2006) . In a recent version of the Bank of England RAMSI model, behavioural responses are related to funding liquidity risks of banks (Aikman et al., 2009) . Funding strains increase the default risk of banks, which may at a certain stress level resort to fire sales of assets. This leads to liquidity feedbacks through depressed market prices of assets. Gauthier et al. (2010a) model funding liquidity risk as an endogenous outcome of the interaction between market liquidity risk, solvency risk, and the funding structure of banks. Spill-over effects occur due to the network effects among banks. In the Liquidity Stress-Tester model of Van den End (2010) , second round feedback effects are determined by the number and size of reacting banks and the similarity of reactions. Contagion results from the effects of balance sheet adjustments on prices and volumes in the markets and funding channels where banks are exposed to.
Our paper extends the last model with the proposed Basel III liquidity regulation and a reaction function of the central bank. We contribute to the literature on liquidity risk and bank behaviour by providing a model framework that links funding liquidity risk in a stochastic approach to regulation and central bank operations. The model provides a tool for scenario analyses. As far as we know there is no other model that combines the Basel III regulation and monetary policy in a stresstesting framework. Monte Carlo simulations produce the Basel III liquidity ratios after the first and second round effects of a stress scenario. Since the model is an empirical algorithm that is driven by real data of banks' liquidity positions, it can be applied to all banking systems that comply with Basel III. In the model, banks react according to the proposed new liquidity standards, by assuming that they are a binding incentive to behaviour. Behavioural responses have wider effects, through reputation risk and market-wide disturbances, by which liquidity risk is endogenous. We simulate the first and second round shock effects on the funding liquidity of banks and generate measures of systemic risk under various stress scenarios. This process enables a quantification of some wider consequences of the proposed liquidity regulation, for instance the impact on credit supply. This impact is found to be limited in the model simulations of liquidity stress scenarios. Another result is that second round effects and tail risks of a stress scenario are substantially lower if banks would adjust to Basel III by holding a higher quality of liquid assets. In particular a narrowly defined liquidity buffer -made up by high quality government bonds -makes a big difference in limiting the tail risks of banks. The flip side of larger bond holdings is that monetary policy conducted through asset purchases gets more influence on banks relative to central bank refinancing operations. We also simulate the consequences of an exit from extended refinancing operations on banks' funding liquidity. The outcomes indicate that the liquidity ratios of banks actually improve compared to the pre-exit situation, if alternative stable funding is available.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the measures taken by central banks and supervisors in the crisis and how these interact. Section 3 outlines the model framework and explains its structure for the first and second round effects of shocks to banks' liquidity risk and the reaction function of the central bank. Sensitivity analyses are performed to test the robustness of the model to parameter changes. Section 4 presents model simulations for Dutch banks as an illustration of the impact of different scenarios and the influence of Basel III and central bank interventions. Section 5 concludes.
Measures by central banks and regulators

Central bank measures
The adverse funding and market liquidity conditions have led central banks to engage in unconventional monetary policy measures from 2007 onward (see IMF, 2010 , for an overview). They have increased their intermediary role in the money market at an unprecedented scale and have become buyer of last resort in some dysfunctional credit markets. The unconventional measures were necessary because of impaired monetary transmission channels. By buying assets, or allow them to be used as collateral in open market operations, a central bank counters a drying up of market liquidity and supports the funding liquidity of banks.
The main unconventional monetary policy measure has been additional liquidity supply through easing access to refinancing operations and extending volumes and maturities. The ECB for instance has provided unlimited liquidity to banks at a fixed interest rate (fixed rate full allotment), also through 6 and 12 months tenders. The increased intermediary role of central banks has improved bank's liquidity position, leading to a large oversupply in the money market.
A main measure to shore up stressed credit markets has been the purchases of public and private sector bonds. Central banks around the world have targeted different market segments, with the overall aim to ease the financial conditions for financial institutions and other agents and support market liquidity and credit supply. The Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England have purchased large amounts of public and private securities; the ECB purchased covered bonds (Covered Bond Purchase Programme) and EMU sovereign bonds (Securities Markets Programme) to a more limited extent.
New liquidity regulation
The financial sector problems were partly rooted in mismanagement of liquidity risks and this has triggered a number of initiatives to foster more sound liquidity management. Regulatory initiatives internalise the negative externalities of liquidity risk to some extent, by shifting the costs of liquidity insurance to the private sector. This should also help to reduce the moral hazard risk of banks counting on the central bank for a bail-out. The Basel Committee has proposed a number of regulatory reforms in response to the G20 which urged to enhance tools, metrics and benchmarks that supervisors can use to address the resilience of banks' liquidity cushions and constrain any weakening in liquidity maturity profiles (G20, 2009). Key part of the new regulatory framework is two minimum standards for the funding liquidity risk of banks (BCBS, 2009) , the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR). After an observation period, the LCR will move to a minimum standard in 2015 and the NSFR in 2018. Before they become binding regulation, it is expected that banks will already start to adapt to these rules, in response to market pressure.
The LCR ensures that banks have a sufficient liquidity buffer to survive an acute stress scenario lasting for one month. It is defined as the stock of unencumbered high quality liquid assets, divided by net cash outflows over a 30-day time period. The ratio should be at least 100% at all times.
The numerator includes cash, central bank reserves, high quality sovereign bonds and a proportion of high quality corporate bonds and/or covered bonds; these 'level 2 assets' are capped at 40% of the total stock of liquid assets and receive appropriate haircuts (BCBS, 2010) . Net cash outflows are determined by the total expected cash outflows minus total expected cash inflows and reflect the net amount of funding that may disappear within the 30 days under a stress scenario (see Section 3.2 and Annex 1). 
Interaction between liquidity regulation and monetary policy
By changing the behaviour of banks, the new liquidity regulation interacts with the implementation of monetary policy and the transmission through the money market. The main intended consequence will be that banks that meet the LCR and NSFR are less dependent on central bank financing. For instance, the incentive to hold high quality liquid assets improves the capacity of banks to absorb shocks.
Nonetheless, the relatively low 25% run-off rate in the LCR for secured central bank borrowing (backed by assets not included in the stock of liquid assets) and full roll-over for secured funding (backed by buffer eligible assets) may increase the reliance on the central bank. Those effects are simulated with the model in Section 4.
There could also be other unintended interactions between regulation and monetary policy.
The LCR gives an incentive to hold high quality liquid assets, which could increase the use of lower quality assets as collateral in repo transactions with the central bank. The standard also promotes a lengthening of funding maturities to over one month, which could trigger higher demand in longerterm refinancing operations of the central bank. This can cause a steepening of the money market yield curve. Demand in the money market can further be affected by the 100% run-off assumption for unsecured wholesale funding that matures within one month. Possibly banks react to that by holding more liquid assets that can be used as collateral in secured short-term markets, so that the turnover in these markets increase. Banks can also shore up their liquidity profile by lengthening the maturity of their wholesale funding, which may cause a steeper credit curve for bank borrowing. Or banks can substitute wholesale funding for retail savings, the latter having a relative low run-off rate in the LCR and a high ASF factor in the NSFR. All such reactions have implications for monetary policy in normal circumstances, but also in times of stress. In Section 4 we simulate how the changing behaviour of banks, triggered by the new liquidity regulation, interacts with monetary policy measures.
Model
Framework
Liquidity Stress-Tester is a four stage algorithm, as represented by Figure 1 in stylised form. It models banks' liquidity profiles after the first round effects of a stress scenario (t1), after the mitigating actions of the banks (t2), after the second round effects (t3) and after the central bank reaction (t4). In each stage, the model generates distributions of the LCR by individual banks (including tail outcomes and the probability of breaching a certain LCR level). The scenario horizon is one month, equal to the assumed stress horizon in the LCR. In the initial stage, LCR t0 and NSFR t0 are based on available balance sheet and cash flow information of a bank. At t1 the first round effects of scenario shocks are simulated (see first row in Figure 1 ). This is conducted through Monte Carlo simulations of market and liquidity risk events, which are combined in a multi-factor scenario. A scenario is designed as a set of shocks to banks' liquid asset and liability items (i) and is uniformly applied to all banks. In the model, any consistent combination of shocks can be chosen. For instance, a credit market scenario is designed by assuming shocks to tradable credit portfolios, collateral values and margin calls as first round effects. Shocks are reflected in stressed weights of balance sheet and cash flow items (w i ), with w i being the haircut or shocked inflow rate in case of liquid assets and withdrawal rate in case of liabilities. The weights are based on the weighting factors proposed by the Basel Committee for determining the LCR. The liquidity ratio declines through changes in the weighting factors, which reflect reduced inflows, higher outflows and additional haircuts on assets and thereby reduce LCR t1 compared to LCR t0 (see Figure 1) . We assume that the scenario shocks do not affect the weighting factors of the NSFR, because it is a structural mismatch measure based on fixed weights for available and required funding.
In the second stage (t2), the mitigating measures by banks in response to the scenario are simulated. Banks react if LCR t1 falls by more than a threshold θ and is below the supervisory requirement of 100%. They aim to restore the ratio back to the initial level, assuming this is the desired steady state ratio. Banks are assumed to react by 'within exposure' adjustments, conducted through shortening the maturity of assets and lengthening the maturity of liabilities and 'across exposure' adjustments, conducted through increasing liquid assets (stable liabilities) and reducing illiquid assets (volatile liabilities). This reaction rule reflects the incentives of the LCR and NSFR.
Hence, the related responses by banks improve both supervisory ratios (LCR t2 and NSFR t2 ).
The second round effects in stage 3 (t3) are shaped by systemic market-wide effects and idiosyncratic reputation effects (see Figure 1 ). The systemic effects reflect the market disturbances due to the reactions of banks in stage 2. In the model, these disturbances are larger if: i) more banks react, ii) reactions are more similar and iii) the reacting banks are larger. Following from the reaction rule, the market-wide effects are largest on illiquid asset markets (where assets are sold) and markets for stable sources of funding (where banks scramble for funding). The model assumes that responding to the scenario has negative repercussions for the bank involved. It faces reputation risk, as it might be perceived to be in trouble by conducting measures to restore its liquidity ratio (signalling effect). Both the possible loss of reputation and the wider effects on markets have an impact on LCR t3 , through additional haircuts on liquid assets and net outflows of liquidity, reflected in further stressed weights (w i ) of the items. The NSFR remains unchanged, since the items on the balance sheet do not change in t3 and the stressed weights have no impact on this structural mismatch ratio.
The fourth stage of the framework becomes effective when the central bank reaction rule is activated (see Figure 1) . In that case, the central bank intervenes in the market to mitigate the second round effects of the crisis scenario. The framework allows for asset purchases by the central bank and of banks that rely on central bank credit and/or have exposures to supported asset classes.
Data
Liquidity Stress-Tester is a top-down framework, run with bank level data. We use the liquidity positions of Dutch banks that are available from the supervisory liquidity report (DNB, 2003) . The balance sheet items are weighed by haircuts or inflow rates of assets and run-off rates of liabilities as proposed by the Basel Committee (see Annex 1 2 ). These fixed weights reflect a mix of a bank specific and market wide scenario, which makes them a useful point of departure for our model. The weights can easily be adjusted in the model, if the Basel Committee would opt for different values. In the initial stage t0, liquid assets and liabilities are multiplied with those regulatory weights. The parameterisation of the haircuts, inflow and run-off rates, either based on best practices or historic data, is a weakness in most liquidity risk models of banks. This is because data of stress situations are scarcely available and in times of stress the assumed elasticities may behave differently. As a consequence, a bank may be too optimistic about the liquidity of assets and the stability of its funding.
To account for this uncertainty the model is based on a stochastic approach, by using Monte Carlo simulations of haircuts, inflow and run-off rates (see next Section).
The weights (haircuts, inflow and run-off rates) of the LCR at t0 are included in the i x 1 dimensional vector W LCR . The available and required stable funding factors of the NSFR (ASF, RSF in Annex 1) are included in vectors W NSFR_ST and W NSFR_LT . The former contains the ASF and RSF factors that are applicable to the balance sheet items with maturity up to 12 months and the latter the factors that belong to the items with a maturity longer than 12 months. 
3.3
Initial liquidity ratios
Liquid assets ∑I j in Equation 2 is the weighted sum of assets 1, 2 .. j defined by the Basel Committee as the stock of high quality liquid assets and level 2 liquid assets (up to 40% of the total buffer, BCBS, 2010). This buffer contains assets measured in stressed conditions, as reflected by the haircuts w j LCR .
Vector I LCR, t0 
Vector I NSFR_ST in Equation 6 contains the liability items with maturity up to 12 months and I NSFR_LT in Equation 7 the asset items with maturity longer than 12 months. W NSFR_ST and W NSFR_LT are the vectors with ASF and RSF factors as defined in Section 3.2.
First round effects
In the model, the fixed weighting factors of LCR t0 are assumed to be 0.1% tail events (w i LCR ≈ 3 x σ).
The scenario impact of the first round effect on an item i at t1 is determined by simulated weights (w i sim1 ). These are based on Monte Carlo simulations by taking random draws from a normal distribution, scaled by (w i LCR / 3) and transformed to a log-normal distribution 3 , so that w i sim1 ~ Log-N (, 2 ). The use of a log-normal distribution is motivated by the typical non-linear features of extreme liquidity stress events. The log-normal distribution, which is skewed to the right, captures this feature. Its asymmetric shape fits well on financial market data in particular in high volatility regimes. For that reason the log-normality of asset returns plays an important role in theory of risk management and asset pricing models. Besides, the log-normal distribution is bounded below by 0, which fits with the simulated weights in our model. As an upper bound, the weights are conditioned by (w i LCR + w i sim1 )  100%, since haircuts and withdrawal rates can not exceed 100%.
The first round effects have an impact on the liquidity position of bank b, which is modelled through additional haircuts on assets, reduced inflows and higher outflows (reflected in w i sim1 ), on top of the regulatory weighting factors (w i LCR ), affecting LCR b t1 and its subcomponents,
The log normal distribution is derived by Exp (N (0,1) * (w i LCR / 3)), based on the fact that if
W sim1 in Equation 10-11 is the i x 1 dimensional vector of simulated effects of the first round of the scenario. The scenario shocks do not change the available and required stable funding factors (ASF, RSF). These reflect the structural mismatch on the balance sheet and are assumed not to be influenced by a stress scenario that lasts for the shorter horizon of the LCR (i.e. one month). Hence, NFSR t1 = NSFR t0.
Mitigating actions by banks
In remains above 100% a bank has sufficient buffer capacity to absorb the scenario shocks and has no need to react. A reacting bank tries to restore its liquidity ratio by raising additional liquid assets and improve the stability of funding, up to the level of its initial liquidity ratio. This reaction rule reflects the liquidity hoarding and the scramble for stable sources of funding by banks in the crisis (ECB, 2009 If the horizon of the scenario is short, it is more likely that reactions will be static (λ > 0.5 and S dominates), while a longer period of time provides banks more leeway to steer their balance sheets (λ < 0.5 and R dominates). Since the mitigating actions of a bank change its balance sheet composition in the direction of a lower maturity mismatch (reflected in vectors I LCR,t2 and I NSFR,t2 ), both supervisory ratios improve compared to the ratios at t1 (with LCR t2 > LCR t1 and NSFR t2 > NSFR t1 ).
Second round effects
The reactions of banks have wider disturbing (endogenous) effects on markets that feed back on the banks. This will crystallise in additional haircuts on liquid assets in the markets where banks react and/or cause additional withdrawals and reduce the availability of liquid funding. For instance, if 6 A restriction in the model is that a bank with no exposure in a certain market does not enter this market.
many banks try to lengthen their funding profile, term funding will become scarcer. Such effects are reflected in w i sim2 , an element of the i x 1 dimensional vector of simulated second round effects,
The multiplication factor to the first round effects (w i sim1 ), which determines the second round effects (w i sim2 ), depends on the number of reacting banks (n react ) and increases if n react exceeds a hurdle level 
Like in case of the first scenario round, the NSFR remains unchanged since the items on the balance sheet do not change in t3, neither do the available and required stable funding factors (ASF, RSF).
Therefore NFSR t3 = NSFR t2 .
Central bank reaction function
The 
where p is the price of an illiquid asset and q n the fraction of illiquid assets sold by n banks on the market. The maximum price p = 1 occurs when sales are zero. Parameter α is a positive constant and is calibrated by assuming that p falls by around 50% if all illiquid assets of the banks are sold (as in Cifuentes et al., 2005) . The corresponding value of α is 0.8. If q n = 0.2 the haircut on market prices is 15% (Figure 4 ). This equals for instance the haircut w i LCR on level 2 bonds (BCBS, 2010), which reflects a three standard deviation shock on these assets (see Section 3.4). We extended Equation 27 with asset purchases by the central bank (q CB ) that counters the price effects of asset sales,
and shift the demand curve up to the right (see Figure 4) . If asset purchases equal banks' fire sales (q CB = q n ) there is no price effect and p = 1. The mitigating effect of central bank interventions crystallise in lower second round weights for bonds. For instance, if the fire sales of level 2 bonds would be 20% (q n = 0.2) and the central bank purchases half this amount (q CB = 0.1) than w i sim2 for those bonds is limited at 7.5% in stead of 15%. This mitigates the shock to a 1.5 standard deviation event. The central bank could target specific market segments. For instance, the reaction function can be framed such that w i sim2 is only limited for covered bonds. The limited haircuts support the value of assets included in the numerator of LCR and hence LCR t4 > LCR t3 . Banks with exposures to the supported asset classes will benefit more than other banks from the asset purchases. 
The impact of different scenario rounds
Each round of a scenario has its typical effect on the distribution of liquidity ratios. As an example in Figure 5a , the simulation outcomes of bank P, which reacts to the first scenario round, show that the first round effect leads to a shift of the distribution to the left (LCR t1 ), while the mitigating actions shift the distribution (LCR t2 ) back towards the initial ratio LCR t0 . 8 If a bank does not react, because the change of its LCR t1 does not exceed threshold θ or LCR t1 remains larger than 100%, the distributions of LCR t1 and LCR t2 coincide. This is the case with bank Q in Figure 5b . The second round effects that hit the bank shift the distribution (LCR t3 ) to the left again. Banks that do not react, such as bank Q, do not face a reputation risk and this limits the second round effect of a scenario. It shows up in a more limited shift of distribution LCR t3 to the left, compared to the reacting bank (compare the most left distributions in Figures 5a and 5b ). On the other hand, mitigating actions improve a banks' liquidity profile, since the bank partly reacts according to the regulatory rule; i.e. it increases its liquid asset holdings and stable funding, while reducing illiquid assets and volatile funding. As a result, the second round of the scenario leads to a less dispersed distribution of outcomes than the first round effects. 8 The x-axes of Charts 5a-b scale the LCR as an index with LCR t0 = 100. 9 The standard deviation of LCR t3 is smaller than the standard deviation of LCR t1.
Parameter sensitivity
The calibration of λ (behavioural parameter), n syst (threshold for number of reacting banks) and the level of market stress (ω) can be based on economic intuition, guided by sensitivity analyses. As an illustration we test the sensitivity of the model outcomes to changing the parameter values for a stylised bank (bank Y in Annex 3). A hypothetical scenario is assumed to affect all liquid assets and liabilities, through fixed instead of stochastically simulated weights. Furthermore, it is assumed that the first round effect of the scenario leads to a decline of the initial liquidity ratio that exceeds the threshold θ and that the bank reacts with all instruments available at its disposal (i.e. liquid assets, credit, term funding, savings and equity, as presented on the stylised balance sheet). In the base line situation, the level of market stress (ω) is set at 1.5, the number of reacting banks (n react ) at 10 and the behavioural parameter λ at 0.5. in the baseline situation. The model outcomes are quite sensitive to changes of ω (LCR t3 is 28% lower if ω = 3). This is in line with the intuition that extreme market conditions can severely impact on the liquidity risk of banks. Following from Equation 21, the impact of reputational risk (due when banks respond to a scenario by mitigating actions) also depends on the level of market stress. Table 1 shows that reputation risk could severely impact on banks in stressed markets. In a tail situation with ω = 3, the LCR is more than halved compared to the baseline in which reputational risk is assumed to be absent and ω = 1.5. Both the number of reacting banks and hurdle level n syst have the expected impact on LCR t3 , indicating the models' sensitivity to behavioural reactions. Increasing the number of reacting banks exacerbates the second round effects of a scenario (as reflected in Equation 18) and reduces LCR t3 . This effect is stronger at a lower value of n syst . It implies that a higher susceptibility to collective responses leads to larger second round effects if more banks react.
Shifting behavioural parameter λ has the expected influence on the LCR. If the reaction rule does not follow the new regulation at all (i.e. λ = 1, meaning that regulatory variable R has no influence) LCR t3 is almost 20% lower than under the reaction rule in the baseline situation (λ = 0.5). If a bank only reacts according to the regulatory incentive (λ = 0), the LCR is almost 20% higher than in the baseline. This is because the regulatory variable R promotes that a bank changes its balance sheet composition from less liquid to more liquid assets (and from volatile to stable funding), which improves the liquidity ratio.
The stylised example assumes that the bank reacts to the scenario because the decline of LCR t1 compared to LCR t0 exceeds threshold θ = 25%, with LCR t1 < 100%. To illustrate the sensitivity of the model outcomes to changing threshold θ, a crisis scenario was run (for all Dutch banks in the sample)
with a lower and a higher threshold. Table 2 shows that a higher threshold level improves the final outcome of the LCR. Although banks' reactions to restore the liquidity profile mitigate the first round impact of a scenario, if more banks would react, the disturbing influence of collective responses dominate the mitigating effects. Table 2 shows that if θ = 5%, five more banks would react compared to the baseline situation (θ = 25%), while 16 banks less would react if θ is raised to 75%. The reduced number of collective responses limits the second round effects of the scenario, with LCR t3 on average being 8 percentage points higher than in the baseline situation. 
Results
This
Credit crisis scenario
The credit crisis scenario in first instance affects the asset side of banks' balance sheets. It assumes declining values of tradable credit portfolios, strains in repo markets and higher margin requirements on banks' derivative positions. Similar to the recent crisis, we assume difficulties to roll-over asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) and drawings on committed liquidity facilities of banks. Increased counterparty risks among banks worsens their access to funding in bond and commercial paper markets. These first round effects are simulated by stressing the weights of credit portfolios, margin requirements, liquidity facilities and securities issued (through w sim1 , see Table 3 ). Table 3 shows the weighted average outcomes for the whole sample of banks. 12 The first round effect erases over 16 percentage points of the initial LCR, with a maximum of around 100
percentage points for the bank that is most severely affected. Although most banks would be hit by the scenario (i.e. LCR t1 < LCR t0 ), banks that are not affected at this stage are mostly small branches of foreign banks. They can count on liquidity support from the head office and probably therefore do not hold eligible collateral (which explains why the LCR of some bank is nil). Table 3 shows that in case of 26 banks, the decline of LCR t1 compared to LCR t0 exceeds threshold θ = 25% and LCR t1 < 100%. This triggers them to restore their liquidity ratio to the initial level (LCR t0 ). The reactions mitigate the first round effect of the scenario on the sector as a whole to 10 percent points on average (the difference between LCR t2 and LCR t0 ). We find that larger banks with a more diversified funding structure tend to react relatively more than smaller banks, which relates to the higher probability that large universal banks are hit by the credit crisis scenario.
According to the model (Equation 18
), the responses of large banks potentially have a relatively strong impact on markets.
The collective responses of banks (e.g. fire sales of assets, acquiring stable funding sources) in response to the first round shocks of the scenario further disturb financial markets. As a consequence, in the second round of the scenario, market illiquidity spills over into strained funding liquidity. These second round effects (w sim2 , see Table 3 ) are simulated by further stressing the haircuts of assets and run-off of liabilities on top of the first round effects, according to Equations 18-20. The reputation risk of the reacting banks translates into additional (idiosyncratic) stress on the weights (w simR ) according to
Equation 21. On the other hand, banks that react improve their liquidity profile, by increasing liquid asset holdings and stable funding, while reducing illiquid assets and volatile funding. All in all, reputation and systemic (second round) effects have an impact on the final liquidity ratio (LCR t3 ). Table 3 shows that on average LCR t3 is 38 percent points lower than the ratio after the mitigating actions (48.1 minus 10.0 percentage points). It also shows the 5% and 1% tail outcomes. In the 5% (1%) tail the LCR declines by 58 (60) percentage points on average. Insight in the extreme tail outcomes is particularly relevant for financial stability analysis which assesses the resilience of the 12 If the denominator of the LCR equals 0 because outflow = inflow, than the LCR is fixed at 100%. system to extreme, but plausible shocks. We find no significant correlation between the shortfall probability and size or funding diversification of banks, indicative of the systemic dimension of the second round effects, which affect all types of banks.
Wholesale and retail bank scenarios
The bank run scenarios simulate funding liquidity crises, seizing at the liability side of banks' balance sheets. The wholesale run assumes that banks and other professional money market parties withdraw unsecured demand deposits from other banks and do not roll-over their unsecured fixed term deposits.
The retail run scenario assumes a run on retail saving accounts, through withdrawal of demand deposits and no roll-over of fixed term deposits. The first round effects of the scenarios are simulated by stressing the weights of the affected demand and fixed term deposits (through w sim1 , see Table 3 ).
These weights determine the amount of liquidity lost (E b t1 ) due to the first round of the scenarios, according to Equation 13 and determine LCR t1 according to Equation 8. Table 3 shows that on average the first round effects are larger in the wholesale scenario (LCR t1 declines almost 5 percent points) than in the retail scenario. Besides, the scenarios have a different distributional impact. We find that the wholesale scenario has a larger impact on big banks than small banks; while less diversified banks are most susceptible for the retail scenario. Less diversified banks are usually more dependent on savings and therefore vulnerable to a retail run. In the retail run scenario there are 20 (mostly smaller) banks where the decline of LCR t1 compared to LCR t0 exceeds threshold θ = 25%, while LCR t1 < 100%. This triggers them to restore their liquidity ratio to the initial level (LCR t0 ). In the wholesale scenario the number of reacting banks is smaller. The reactions barely mitigate the first round effect of the scenarios (LCR t2 ≈ LCR t1 ), which indicates that the market disruptions of the first round effects reduce the opportunities for banks to raise additional liquidity. The mitigating actions markedly improve the NSFR. This owes to the regulatory component in the reaction rule, which stimulate banks to reduce their funding mismatch.
In the second round of the scenarios, the mitigating actions lead to further stress on asset values (fire sales raise the haircuts on assets) and funding (liquidity hoarding by counterparties increases the run-off rates of funding). Next to these systemic second round effects, reacting banks face a reputation risk. On average, LCR t3 declines 46.2 percentage points in the retail scenario, compared 39.8 percentage points in the wholesale scenario. The effects in the former scenario are larger because more banks react (20 versus 12 in the wholesale scenario), leading to more wide spread market disturbances and reputational effects than in the latter scenario. As a consequence, the 5% (1%) tail risks are also larger in the retail scenario; the LCR is 61.6 (63.1) percentage points lower than the initial ratio on average.
The impact on credit supply
The model allows for analysing the impact of liquidity stress and the reactions by banks on credit supply. The credit effect depends on the reaction function in Equation 12, which is driven by 'within exposure' (S t2 ) and 'across exposure' adjustments (regulatory variable R t2 ), as well as by parameter λ.
Within exposure adjustments in the case of loans imply according to Equation 16 that outstandings with a maturity up to one year are increased, while longer term loans are reduced. Across exposure adjustments imply that banks increase the most liquid assets (items with w RSF < 50), while reducing less liquid assets. Assume that the RSF for residential mortgages and other loans with a maturity up to one year (with a 35% or better risk weight under Basel II's standardised approach for credit risk) is 65 and the RSF is 50 for loans to non-financial corporate clients (BCBS, 2010) . The resulting unweighted average RSF for the retail and corporate credits (57.5) is close to 50, the pivoting factor that determines the extent to which banks increase or reduce individual balance sheet items in Equations 16-17. This implies that banks only slightly reduce their loan books in response to shocks.
The impact on credit supply is illustrated by the credit crisis scenario at various values of parameter λ (see Figure 6 ). In all cases, total credit supply contracts limitedly, with the contraction in long term loans exceeding that of short term loans. 13 This follows from both components of the reaction rule; S t2 causes a shortening of the maturity of assets (e.g. an increase of short-term loans and decrease of long term loans) and R t2 an increase of liquid assets at the expense of illiquid assets (i.c.
longer-term loans). Simulation outcomes of the credit crisis scenario with λ = 0.5 show that long term loans would be reduced by 0.6%, while short term loans are barely affected (see Figure 6 ). The latter owes to the 'within exposure' adjustment, which implies that long term loans are substituted for short term loans. If this rule dominates (λ = 0.75) than short term credit even increase. The regulatory part of the reaction rule has a downward effect on both short and long term loans, since w NSFR_ST and w NSFR_LT are both higher than 50. Of course this outcome depends on the calibration of the RSF for loans; if it would be lower than assumed in the simulation, there would be less downward pressures on credit supply. Simulations were run for extended refinancing operations and asset purchases together and separately. The outcomes indicate that central bank interventions substantially mitigate the second round effects of a stress scenario. In the example of the credit crisis scenario, extended refinancing operations together with asset purchases result in LCR t3 being on average nearly 6 percentage points higher compared to the scenario excluding central bank interventions (see Figure 7) . The interventions limit tail risk in particular, as indicated by the higher outcome of the 5 and 1% tail ratios. Tail risks are relatively more limited by asset purchases than by extended refinancing operations. This is explained by the fact that for most banks, bond holdings are an important item on the balance sheet, implying that limiting the volatility of bond prices reduces the risk of small probability, high impact losses of banks. The tail risks primarily relate to riskier bonds, such as issued by corporates. High quality government bond holdings have less tail risk. This is indicated by the outcomes of simulating only government bond purchases by the central bank, which have less influence on the tail impact (see Figure 7) . The outcome that asset purchase programs are more effective in limiting second round effects than extended refinancing operations can also be explained by the reactions of banks after the first round of the scenario. Based on the regulatory incentive in the reaction rule, banks increase their bond holdings (i.e. liquid assets with a low RSF factor as reflected in w NSFR_ST ) and reduce their reliance on central bank funding (i.e. liabilities with a low ASF factor as reflected in w NSFR_ST ). This is an intended effect of the proposed Basel liquidity regulation, which aims at strengthening the capacity of banks to withstand shocks independently from the central bank. The model reflects this feature in the reaction rule. As a consequence, asset purchases would get more influence on the adjusted balance sheets than refinancing operations. This is further illustrated by simulating the credit crisis scenario with a lower weight of the regulatory component in the reaction rule (λ = 0.75 in stead of λ = 0.5). This implies that banks' responses to the scenario are more based upon 'within exposure' adjustments (S t2 dominates the reaction rule) and less on regulatory incentives (R t2 ). Under that assumption, extended refinancing operations are more effective than asset purchases. Central bank financing lifts the average LCR 6
percentage points compared to the scenario excluding interventions (see Figure 7) . This result illustrates the interaction of Basel III with monetary policy. Banks that do not fully adapt to Basel III, by having less stable funding and fewer liquid assets than they would have when following the regulation, are more dependent on central bank borrowing in times of stress. The flip side is that banks with high liquid asset holdings are more dependent on developments in bond markets. For monetary policy this implies that central banks increasingly may have to resort to asset purchases in stead of refinancing operations to influence banks' liquidity positions.
The simulation of the exit from extended central bank refinancing operations shows that the consequences of an exit for funding liquidity risk depend on the way in which banks substitute central bank borrowings with alternative funding sources. If banks would increase wholesale funding again by issuing unsecured debt securities, the average LCR falls back to its pre-intervention level. However, if banks are able to compensate the reduced central bank borrowing with increased retail savings, the LCR actually improves compared to the pre-exit situation (see Figure 8 ). This reflects that retail savings are more stable than central bank funding, as reflected in the LCR.
Effects of adjusting to the new liquidity regulation
The new liquidity regulation stimulates that banks increase their liquid buffers (through the LCR) and reduce their funding mismatch (through the NSFR). This should make the sector more resilient to adverse shocks to market and funding liquidity. It will reduce the risk of behavioural responses by banks and related disturbing effects on markets. Moreover, moral hazard risks of banks counting on the central bank are also reduced. To simulate the benefits of the regulatory incentives, we run the credit crisis scenario with the presupposition that banks had adjusted their liquidity position before the scenario in line with Basel III. First, we assume that banks hold more liquid assets (+25%), while other assets, for instance loans, are proportionally lower. The second assumption is that banks substituted level 2 liquid assets (corporate bonds, covered bonds) with high quality government bonds. This gives an indication of the difference that a narrow buffer definition -which only allows for high quality assets -can make compared to a broad definition, in terms of stress resilience. Thirdly, we assume that banks partly substituted wholesale funding for retail savings, which are a more stable funding source with a lower run-off rate. In the fourth case, we assume that banks lengthened the maturity of their wholesale funding, by assuming that debt securities maturing within one year were partly replaced by longer term securities. In the fifth case, banks to some extent substituted unsecured with secured borrowing, by reducing interbank deposits and increasing repos. Borrowing in the unsecured market has a negative effect on the LCR through a 100% run-off rate, while repos with high quality collateral have a 0% run-off rate.
16 16 The assumptions are applied by changing the elements in vectors I LCR,t0 , I NSFR_ST, t0 and I NSFR_LT, t0 . The first assumption implies that liquid asset holdings -the numerator in the LCR -are 25% higher and that this amount proportionally reduces other assets. The second assumption implies that high quality government bond holdings are 25% higher, while level 2 bonds are reduced by the same amount. Under the third condition, debt securities issued are 25% lower, while retail savings are increased by the same amount. The fourth assumption implies that debt securities maturing within one year are reduced by 25% and longer term securities increased by the same Percentage point difference compared to outcomes with initial liquidity profiles Figure 9 shows that the stress scenario has less impact on banks if liquidity profiles are stronger in the initial situation. The scenario impact would be most mitigated if banks improve their stock of liquid asset holdings. In case banks have 25% more liquid assets, the LCR after the first round of the scenario is over 12 percentage points higher on average, while a higher quality of liquid assets is most effective to limit the tail risks. Substituting riskier bonds, for instance corporate bonds, with high quality bond holdings, limits the price volatility of bond portfolios and thereby the probability of extreme losses. It indicates that a narrowly defined liquidity buffer -which limits the numerator of the LCR to high quality sovereign bonds -makes a big difference in containing systemic risk, compared to a broadly defined buffer (the assumption in the baseline). Stronger liquid asset buffers contribute more to stress resilience than substituting wholesale for retail funding, unsecured for secured funding or prolonging the maturity of wholesale funding (see Figure 9) . A main reason for this is that a higher level and quality of liquidity buffers enhance the capacity to absorb the first round effects of a stress scenario, which reduces the risk of collective reactions and related disturbing market effects. The outcomes underscores that the incentives in Basel III, to enhance liquidity buffers through the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, are an important contribution to reduce systemic risk.
amount. The fifth condition implies that unsecured funding is reduced by 25% and secured borrowing increased by the same amount.
Conclusion
The The model outcomes lend support to policy initiatives to enhance the liquidity buffers and reduce liquidity mismatches of banks, as proposed by the Basel Committee (BCBS, 2009 (BCBS, , 2010 . A sufficient level of high quality liquid assets limits the idiosyncratic risks to a bank, by providing counterbalancing funding capacity to weather a liquidity crisis. Moreover, stronger liquidity profiles are important to reduce the risk of collective reactions by banks and thereby to prevent second round effects and instability of the financial system as a whole. The model provides a tool to evaluate the effects of behavioural changes on banks' liquidity positions and systemic liquidity risk under different scenarios. While the model is applied to Dutch banks in the paper, it is applicable to other countries' banking systems as well, since it is based on balance sheet data and parameters that are, or will become, commonly available as a result of Basel III.
ANNEX 1 (source: BCBS, 2009) ANNEX 2
Source: Credit System Supervision Manual, articles 44 -47, 2.3 Liquidity Risk, www.dnb.nl)
LIQUIDITY VALUES OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
For the liquidity test for the full month, a distinction is made between non-scheduled items and scheduled items. In contrast to non-scheduled items, scheduled items are included on the basis of their possible or probable due dates. For the liquidity test for the first week, scheduled items are only included if they are explicitly taken into account in day-to-day liquidity management (treasury operations). In the following Total M = Scheduled item. M) = Settlement due within one week or open-ended, including first week or as scheduled. * = Less applicable discount. ** = Either at stated percentage or at percentages applicable for ECB/ESCB collateral purposes. *** = Calculated amount for the period concerned. 90/d*/** = 90% OR: less applicable discount (provided the method is consistently applied).
